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Abstract. In the past few years, the ethical ramifications of AI technologies (in particular data science) 
have been at the center of intense debates. Considerable attention has been devoted to understanding how 
a morally responsible practice of data science can be promoted, and which values have to shape it. In this 
context, ethics and moral responsibility have been mainly conceptualized as compliance to widely shared 
principles. However, several scholars have highlighted the limitations of such a principled approach. 
Drawing from microethics and the virtue theory tradition, in this paper we formulate a different approach 
to ethics in data science which is based on a different conception of ‘being ethical’ and, ultimately, of what 
it means to promote a morally responsible data science. First, we develop the idea that, rather than only 
compliance, ethical decision making consists in using certain moral abilities (e.g. virtues), which are 
cultivated by practicing and exercising them in the data science process. An aspect of virtue development 
that we discuss here is moral attention, which is the ability of data scientists to identify the ethical relevance 
of their own technical decisions in data science activities. Next, by elaborating on the capability approach, 
we define a technical act as ethically relevant when it impacts one or more of the basic human capabilities 
of data subjects. Therefore, rather than ‘applying ethics’ (which can be mindless), data scientists should 
cultivate ethics as a form of reflection on how technical choices and ethical impacts shape one another. 
Finally, we show how this microethical framework concretely works, by dissecting the ethical dimension 
of the technical procedures involved in data understanding and preparation of electronic health records. 
 





The rapid emergence of data science as a field and the pervasive impact of AI and machine learning 
tools have sparked intense debates on the ethical consequences of how data is used for modeling 
and prediction. In particular, requirements for responsible data science have been central for the 
development of data and AI ethics as a discipline. There have been efforts to formulate higher-
level principles (such as beneficence or fairness), which should guide research and development 
of AI tools in a direction consistent with societal values. This way of understanding the discipline 
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has been named hard ethics (Floridi 2018) or macroethics (Bezuidenhout and Ratti 2020), and it 
plays a fundamental role in informing conversations about governance and regulation of AI more 
in general as a policy goal (Floridi 2018). Under this rubric, there has been a proliferation of private 
and public initiatives for formulating the correct principles (Floridi and Cowls 2019; Jobin et al 
2019; Saltz and Dewar 2019). But is this approach effective in making data scientists, and others 
constructing AI systems within society, ‘more ethical’ and more responsible? While this principled 
approach has proven effective as a macroethics, a number of issues have emerged when those 
principles have been implemented in the actual practice of data science. The process described as 
‘from what to how’ (Morley et al 2020) – from the principles to their implementation - has proven 
to be more difficult than expected. Higher-level principles, given their generality, are very difficult 
to be located in actual processes characterizing the daily routine of data scientists.2 But while these 
problems have now been clearly identified, the solutions proposed by many scholars implicitly 
stem from the same roots characterizing the problem itself. As Hagendorff (2020b) has noticed, 
proposed solutions to the ‘from what to how’ problem (Morley et al 2020; Floridi et al 2018; 
Dignum 2018) assume that making principles more precise and more narrowly identifying the 
locus where to apply them, will solve the problem. But this class of solutions remains ‘principled’ 
nonetheless, and this is problematic because of the ineffectiveness of principles and rules in 
fostering better behavior by themselves (McNamara et al 2019; Kelly 2018). In addition to other 
problems identified by Hagendorff (2020b), in this paper we want to focus on an implicit 
conception of ‘ethics’ underpinning these ‘from what to how’ frameworks. Making the principles 
more precise so that data scientists will be able to unambiguously apply them to their work hides 
a conception of ‘ethics’ as rule-based, and hence as a process that can be automated. Moreover, 
this rule-based/automation-seeking conception assumes that ‘being ethical’ is to be understood as 
mere compliance. Within this perspective, compliance can be mindless such that no one is really 
interested in whether data scientists ‘learn ethics’ and become (more or less) independent ethical 
agents, as long as they are compliant (Kelly 2018). In this view, ethical decision making is 
improved only by making sure that data scientists are exposed to the right principles or rules, and 
that they know exactly where to apply them. This view of ethical decision making also reflects on 
what a responsible data science looks like, i.e. compliance- and rule-based.  
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In this paper, we formulate a different approach to ethics in data science which is based on 
a different conception of ‘being ethical’ and, ultimately, of what it means to promote morally 
responsible data science. Rather than mere compliance, ethical decision making consists in using 
certain moral abilities (e.g. virtues), which are cultivated by practicing and exercising them in the 
data science process. Therefore, while we agree with the ‘from what to how’ literature that we 
should embed ethical decision making in the actual data science process, we understand this idea 
of ‘embedding’ as the cultivation of moral abilities in the daily activities of data scientists. We 
consider our approach a ‘microethics’ (Bezuidenhout and Ratti 2020; Hagendorff 2020a; 
Komesaroff 1995), and we conceive it as a form of ethical training and exercise in which the goal 
for a data scientist is to learn how to identify the ethical relevance of his/her day-to-day activities. 
Rather than ‘applying ethics’ (which can be done also mindlessly), data scientists should cultivate 
ethics as a form of reflection on the subtleties of their technical choices: our goal is to provide a 
framework to do this. As an example, we show our approach in action in the analysis of Electronic 
Health Records (EHRs), in particular by describing the dense microethics that emerges even in 
mundane choices that data scientists face in data understanding and data preparation.  
The structure of our paper is as follows. In 1.1, we address some preliminary concerns 
about principles, rules, and character development. In Section 2, we introduce our conception of 
ethical training which, rather than ‘applying ethics’, aims at cultivating ethical dispositions or 
moral abilities. These moral abilities (e.g. virtues) should be cultivated in the same way the 
technical skills necessary to practice data science are learnt (Annas 2011). This implies that, as 
skills are learnt by exercising and practicing, so should moral abilities/virtues. In this paper we 
focus on a preliminary moral ability that we call moral attention. This is the ability to understand 
how the factors of a situation have ethical relevance, and to imagine the ethically-relevant 
consequences of intervening on some of those factors. After having clarified the virtue-theory 
nature of this training, in Section 3 we specify in detail in what sense technical choices in data 
science can be ‘ethically relevant’. To operationalize the notion of ‘ethical relevance’ we adapt the 
capability approach (in particular Nussbaum 2006 and Ruger 2010), though only in a procedural 
and heuristic way. In Section 4 we show how moral attention can be exercised and practiced in 
distinct stages of the data science pipeline, in particular data understanding and preparation for 
analysis of EHRs. Section 4 makes clear how rich a microethics can be, thereby making the case 
for a systematic development and application of our framework for ‘ethical training’ and fostering 
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a more responsible data science. We conclude the article with Section 5, where we provide 
suggestions for future work, and for understanding the relation between the ethical training we 
have described and participatory approaches to technology design. 
 
1.1 Rules, principles, and compliance 
Before we proceed, it is important to qualify more precisely in which sense we think about ‘rule-
based’ ethics, and the differences with respect to an approach aimed to cultivate virtue ‘ethics’. 
 In the previous section we have talked about principles, and then we have raised      some 
considerations about ‘rule-based’ ethics. But it is important to emphasize that there is a difference 
between rules and principles. As succinctly suggested by Zwolinski and Schmidtz (2013), rules 
function as trump cards, in the sense that “[i]f we have a rule, and can believe with complete 
confidence that the rule ought to be followed, and if we ascertain that a certain course of action is 
forbidden (...) that settles it” (p 222). Once we are told that a rule is the right one for the situation, 
and the rule is completely unambiguous, then there is no reason to discuss anything or to think 
about the moral saliency of a situation: you just follow the rule, and that is it. This conception of 
‘following the rule’ - which has some internal problems       -  is also connected to the idea that 
rules are comforting, because “it has the feel of relieving us of moral responsibility” (Zwolinski 
and Schmidt 2013, p 223). When we follow a rule, we are not really taking responsibility for what 
we are doing, because there is nothing we can do but follow the rule3. Principles are different; they 
work like weights rather than trump cards, in the sense that they may orient our actions, but there 
is always plenty of deliberation in understanding how to operationalize and contextualize them, 
especially when it looks like they are in contrast one with the other. This is why acting on principles 
leave us “with no doubt as to who is responsible for weighing them” (Zwolinski and Schmidt 2013, 
p 223). Therefore, deliberating with principles can hardly be done mindlessly, unlike rules. In other 
words, ‘applying’ principles effectively requires some abilities or skills in dealing with moral 
issues. But if this is the case, then why in the previous section we have said that the principled 
approach suffers from the problems of a rule-based ethics? This is because the idea of solving the 
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‘from what to how’ problem by specifying more precisely the principles is based on the idea that 
the shortcomings of principles are addressed by transforming them into rules, in order to guide 
data scientists at every step of the way. This promotes the comfort of an ethics based on rules, 
which can be mindless and can remove (most of)      responsibility      from data scientists 
themselves. Prioritizing mindless compliance is (in our opinion) one fundamental flaw of this view 
- it does not address character, and hence it does not provide a robust ‘infrastructure’ for ethical 
action, nor it leads to autonomous ethical agents4. These considerations alone should be enough to 
argue that this is not the direction we want responsible data science to go. 
 But let us assume for the time being that there is nothing wrong with these features of rule-
based ethics as applied to data science. After all, one may say, if we have the rules, then the ‘from 
what to how’ problem will be solved. But the idea that we can have all the rules covering every 
possible and conceivable situation is controversial. First, there is the normative problem of 
deciding the exact interpretation of the principles in order to turn them into more precise rules. 
Given that general principles can sometimes have conflicting interpretations (Binns 2017), it is not 
clear who gets to decide in which way a principle should be turned into a precise rule of conduct. 
Second, and most important, it is very hard (if not impossible) to come up with a list of rules that 
can cover all possible situations (Allen et al 2000) - there are just too many possible scenarios. We 
can certainly think about a long-term project in which we compile a long list of rules covering all 
possible situations a data scientist will find him/herself in, but this will not change the problem 
that data scientists will be often in situations where principles could not be readily applied to a 
situation. The only way to overcome the shortcomings of a situation where one does not know 
what to do with principles, is to cultivate abilities to recognize and understand, on a case-by-case 
basis, how the principles can be applied (in case we still want to focus on principles) - i.e. cultivate 
moral abilities. This is why we need to cultivate ethics as a form of reflection, rather than as an 
effort to compile lists of rules. 
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making ethics itself something external to practice, and sometimes even alienating. With these remarks we are not 




2. GOOD DATA SCIENTISTS: SKILLS AND VIRTUES 
 
In this section, we introduce our conception of what an ethical training is. 
Data scientists learn how to become data scientists not just by reading textbooks, but by 
developing skills related to that profession. These skills are connected to the practice of coding, to 
the understanding of statistics, to the ability to sufficiently grasp relevant aspects of a new domain 
to model them, to interpret results and communicate them as actionable insights, etc. We develop 
skills by learning how to do the things that a skilled person in a relevant context would do, and we 
learn how to do such things by practicing: “we learn an art of craft by doing the things that we 
shall have to do when we have learnt it” (NE, 1103a). In this context, we learn how to code by 
practicing a lot with coding.  
But it is not just a matter of brute practicing. In a complex task, one needs guidance to 
practice the right skills, in the right way, and in order to strengthen the needed skills; otherwise 
one's practice may reinforce many subtler bad habits other than the few obvious good ones. We 
need to learn from someone who already knows how to do the things related to that particular skill 
– in other words, we need a role model or an exemplar. But learning from a role-model and 
developing skills “involve more than copying a role model” (Annas 2011, p 17). Rather, it is a 
process that involves a virtuous sort of docility or, to use Annas’ expression, the ‘drive to aspire’, 
which is an active disposition and good will to learn in the right way and understand what to follow 
of the role model5. This is not just passive; in fact, it requires a constant dialogue with the exemplar, 
who provides reasons why certain things are done in certain ways. Many of the skills of data 
scientists, as well as biologists, experimental physicists, chemists, etc., are acquired in this way. 
While the ‘theoretical’ part of studying foundational concepts is done earlier in undergraduate 
education, practicing scientists or data scientists learn the ‘skills’ of their disciplines in flexible 
                                                     
5 It is important to be more precise about our use of the term ‘docility’. We use this term in the connotation of the 
scholastic tradition (docilitas), as a twofold ‘virtue’: an openness to learn which is balanced by a critical examination 
on what is taught. It is interesting to note that the role ‘docility’ in science has been analyzed in recent scholarship 
(see for instance Bezuidenhout et al 2018). Understood in this way (and not in the pejorative, contemporary 
connotation), docility is indeed compatible with the ‘drive to aspire’, as a disposition to learn in the right way, by 
avoiding mindlessly copying.  
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and creative ways only later in graduate school or in a professional context.6 This is not to say that 
in undergraduate education there is no place for practice. However, especially at the very early 
stage of scientific education, the training of scientists looks like a ‘dogmatic initiation’ (to use 
Kuhn’s expression), where prospective scientists are taught to perform highly successful and 
established techniques or experiments of a specific discipline. But these are learnt in the kind of 
mindlessly-copying-the-role-model-way that Annas criticizes. The skills that make a practicing 
scientist are learnt by practicing ad nauseam in conjunction with learning from a role model (such 
as a more experienced scientist). 
The recent push towards more ethical and responsible AI, machine learning, and data 
science can be interpreted as suggesting that data scientists should not merely become technically 
good data scientists, but also morally good or responsible. However, the literature is surprisingly 
silent on how one becomes a morally/responsibly good data scientist. Here we suggest that, as 
data scientists become skilled data scientists by cultivating certain technical abilities, so they can 
become morally good data scientists by cultivating certain moral abilities. This analogy is 
supported by the well-established tradition of virtue ethics that, while it separates the nature of 
technical skills and virtues, recognizes a similarity in the way they are acquired (Annas 2011). 
Ideally, the moral abilities that data scientists cultivate will develop into full-blown virtues, but 
they may not be as strong as some conceptions of virtues imply7. In other words, one may be happy 
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7
 In order to better understand this point, the scope of our ethical training, and the analogy with technical training, it 
is important to spend a few words on what is meant here by ‘virtues’. In a very preliminary sense, virtues are usually 
understood as excellences. An excellence is “any stable trait that allows its possessor to excel” (Vallor 2016, p 17) – 
e.g., skills are excellences. In Aristotle, an excellence is a long-lasting attribute in virtue of which something or 
someone is good or things go well (Russell 2015). Excellences in ethics - moral virtues - are stable traits and long-
lasting ways at being good with respect to how we act and live with other people. Now, we are aware of how 
controversial is opting for one notion of virtue rather than another. For instance, it is usually said that virtues are 
dispositions, but this is both vague and incomplete. It is vague because it may make us think that a disposition to 
follow moral rules counts as a virtue, and this is surely not the case. As Annas argues, a virtue is not a natural 
disposition such as a static tendency (e.g. a glass disposed to break under certain circumstances); rather, it is an 
active disposition, in the sense that it is being disposed to act in certain ways. A virtue is also a reliable disposition, 
in the sense one’s acting out of virtue does not do it by accident. But as a disposition is also characteristic, in the 
sense that it is part of a person’s character. Moreover, while virtue is the result of habituation, it is nothing like a 
mindless routine behavior. What we want to say is that any data scientist, in order to be a good data scientist, ideally 
needs to cultivate some of these active, reliable, and characteristic dispositions to live well with other people which, 
from the point of view of data scientists qua data scientists, is to make sure that algorithmic systems not only do not 
harm, but that they also promote flourishing - and this should be the goal of any ethics training. Exactly which 
specific virtues a data scientist needs to be a good data scientist is an open-question - for instance, Hagendorff 
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to have data scientists cultivate dispositions that are almost virtues, or even just cultivate 
components typical of character virtues. 
The similarity between how skills and virtues are acquired suggests a picture of ethical 
training that is based not only on ethical theories, stand-alone ethics courses, or compliance to 
principles or rules. Rather, it implies that being ethical is a difficult achievement. Moreover, in the 
context of data science it suggests that ethics is taught and cultivated in the same way in which 
technical skills are taught, in particular by practicing in the context where they are needed, and by 
having exemplars showing you how and why we should make certain choices rather than others. 
Ethics is embedded in data science, not something external to it (Bezuidenhout and Ratti 2020), 
and data scientists should be provided with exercises, heuristics, and novel problems, in order to 
increase their skills as well as their virtues. Therefore, ‘learning ethics’ is the process of cultivating 
virtues or moral abilities for the data science context;8 it “requires time, experience, and habituation 
to develop it” (Annas 2011, p 14), and the result is “the kind of actively and intelligently engaged 
practical mastery that we find in practical experts such as pianists and athletes9” (Annas 2011, p 
14).  
Our approach has its roots in the virtue ethics tradition, in the sense that we do not ask 
“what do data scientists should do specifically in this and that particular situation?”, but rather 
“how do data scientists become morally ‘good’ data scientists?”. This question is ‘virtue-oriented’, 
because the way it is approached is based on a particular answer to the more fundamental question 
‘what does it mean to be ethical?’ which is ‘it means cultivating some traits or abilities (or virtues) 
to act morally in a given situation’. It remains virtue-oriented even if here we do not discuss full-
blown virtues, but only moral abilities, because the attitude is virtue-oriented. But at this point, 
one may again argue in favor of a rule-based type of ethics. After all, our approach does not directly 
solve the ‘from what to how’ problem because, a common criticism goes, virtue ethics does not 
provide any specific rule to follow, and hence no precise algorithm for the ‘how’ part of the 
                                                     
(2020b) mentions some of them. We understand that this is a strong conception of virtue; here we will focus 
(Section 3) especially on a moral ability which may not entirely fit the bill of a full-blown virtue, but that we think is 
necessary for the other virtues to function properly. 
8 This is something explicitly recognized in Gogoll et al (2021), when they say that we should treat ethical thinking 
as a skill, and that “it needs to be practiced and shaped by the software developers (…) This approach would lead to 
ethical empowerment” (p 20). 
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problem. But, again, it is impossible to have rules that will cover all possible situations a data 
scientist will face. Maybe understanding ‘how’ in this automated and mechanical way is 
misleading in the first place. In virtue ethics terms, the question ‘how do we design these 
algorithmic systems ethically?’ can also be understood as ‘how do we make sure that the next 
generation of data scientists have the skills and abilities to develop ethical algorithmic systems?’. 
This is a more fundamental take on the ‘from what to how problem’, that only a virtue ethics 
perspective can address. 
Although the analogy between technical and ethical training is intuitively convincing, there 
are three problems with this smooth picture. First, the mere analogy does not specify what is the 
target of ‘ethics’, what is ethically relevant, and which virtues or moral abilities we should 
cultivate. Second, even if we had all this information, the analogy by itself would not tell us clearly 
what to do - how to operationalize those ideas is not clear. Finally, in the context of data science 
we lack a fundamental aspect of the cultivation of virtues that is present in the cultivation of skills, 
namely the exemplars. The first two problems will be addressed in the next section. Here we want 
to conclude this section with a few words on the third. As Julia Annas (2011) richly describes in 
her account of how skills are acquired, the role of exemplars is fundamental because “what is 
conveyed from the experts to the learner will require giving the reasons” (p 19). This is not a 
negligible aspect because ‘giving reasons’ or ‘explaining’ “enables the learner to go ahead in 
different situations and contexts” (p 19). While we have moral exemplars in our world, we 
probably do not have moral exemplars tailored for the technosocial aspects of data science, which 
is plagued by a complexity described by Shannon Vallor (2016) as ‘technosocial opacity’. We 
have plenty of ‘moral experts’ in the sense of ‘macroethics’, but we have already emphasized how 
difficult it is to embed their insights in the actual practice of data science. Ideally, we would need 
‘expert’ data scientist practitioners who already help other data scientists to develop their technical 
skills, and that at the same time they explicitly do the same for the moral aspects of their job. This 
is why we think that data ethics should stem necessarily from practicing scientists, rather than 
external moral philosophers or moral experts10. But we are not aware of the existence of such a 
tradition of data scientists that teach ethics as a daily activity to do not on top of other ‘technical’ 
things, but rather as integrated to the technical acts. Even if we do not have exemplars that we can 
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useful in a maieutic process where data scientists learn how to be ‘ethical’.  
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easily identify, we still think that we can provide a heuristic that can stimulate data scientists to go 
in the right direction. 
 
3 MICROETHICS: ETHICAL RELEVANCE AND THE CAPABILITY APPROACH 
 
In the previous section, we have clarified a general idea of ‘ethical training’, which is based on the 
analogy between skills and moral abilities, and the way they are acquired. However, we have 
emphasized some problems, which will be addressed in 3.1 (what is ethical relevance, and which 
virtues or moral abilities are important to cultivate) and 3.2 (how we operationalize the notion of 
ethical relevance). Next, we connect what we have formulated in 3.1. and 3.2 to a complete 
formulation of a microethics approach for the data science context (3.3).  
 
3.1. Ethical Relevance 
The fact that decisions can have ‘ethical relevance’ is central to our approach to ethics based on 
the analogy between virtues and skills. But what does this mean exactly? The answer to this 
question is connected to the very meaning of an ethical training. Van Wynsberghe and Robbins 
(2018) lament that, at least in the case of robotics, ethical issues tend to flatten into issues about 
safety. In other cases, ethics is merely about compliance (Haggendorff 2020b). But recent literature 
on Fair-ML (Fazelpour and Lipton 2020) grasps an important aspect of ethical relevance, namely 
that data scientists with their work can shape other people lives’ in significant ways. This is the 
aspect we want to develop further. 
Ethics is about how one ought to live his/her own life, and one’s conceptions of ‘living 
well’. Whatever ‘good life’ one sees fit for him/herself, it will consist in certain plans and goals 
and it will be realized by instantiating certain patterns of actions or behaviors. These patterns of 
behavior have ethical relevance because they are constitutive of the good life itself.11 Vallor (2016) 
makes a similar argument when she explains the relation between ethics and technology more in 
general, by saying that artifacts and technologies afford specific patterns of thought, valuing, and 
behavior(p 2), and for this reason shape decisions on how to realize those life plans constituting 
the good life. Therefore, the ethical training of data scientists we refer to is a training that can help 
                                                     
11 Shaping other people’s pattern of behavior means impacting their autonomy, but we do not want to characterize it 
necessarily as negative. 
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them to appreciate the way their small technical acts (e.g. the way they clean data, the algorithm 
they choose, etc.) can potentially shape data subjects’ patterns of behavior, thought, and valuing 
to the point that can impact data subjects’ own perception of what it means to live well. It has been 
shown that data science plays a huge role in shaping how data subjects, to use Nussbaum’s 
expression, “adjust their preference to what they think they can achieve12” (2006, p 73).  Because 
of this ‘power’ of data science, a moral skill or ability that data scientists should develop is moral 
attention (see for instance Vallor 2016), which is the ability to recognize the ethical relevance of 
a situation by imagining the way one’s own actions will shape other people’s actions and thoughts. 
We say that ‘moral attention’ is a moral ability or a moral skill on purpose. We recognize that if 
we stick to the strong definition of virtue that we have reported in the previous section, moral 
attention would not completely fit the bill of a virtue. This is because typically virtues allow agents 
to reason, choose, and act accordingly, and moral attention may not be effective in choosing and 
acting, but only in reasoning. However, it is an ability related to the moral dimension of our lives, 
it can be characteristic and reliable, and it is acquired in the same way skills and virtues are. But 
even if it is not a full-blown virtue, we see it nonetheless as strictly connected to other virtues, and 
to the cultivation of virtues13. Without the moral ability of being able to identify the ethical 
relevance of a situation, other virtues may not even be perceived as being relevant to choose and 
act accordingly, because the situation would not be considered as in need of moral deliberation in 
the first place. Therefore, we can say that moral attention is a necessary condition for well-
functioning virtues. And because moral attention is a necessary condition for the other virtues to 
be cultivated, we say that it is a minimal ability that data scientists should develop in order to start 
their ethical training. We leave the question of which other virtues should be cultivated on top of 
this moral ability for another article. 
 
3.2 The Capability Approach as a heuristic to identify focal loci of ethical relevance 
 
While the way we have defined ‘ethical relevance’ is useful, it is excessively broad. We impact 
and shape lives of other people constantly because we are all part of a ‘common life’ (Walzer 
                                                     
12 See for instance Susser et al. 2019 




2006). How do we identify those impacts that really matter? We believe that the capability 
approach can provide a useful heuristic to identify ethically relevant and crucial impacts, and 
hence it is a framework that can be used to develop and cultivate moral attention. 
The capability approach is a political and economic program proposed by Sen (1985), 
which aims to delineate a framework to make comparisons of life quality. Introducing in detail 
this approach goes way beyond the scope of this paper, so we will just focus on a few key aspects. 
Here we use the approach especially in the formulation made by Nussbaum (2006). The 
cornerstone of the capability approach, which differentiates it from other approaches based on 
cost-benefit analysis, is that individuals “should have access to the necessary positive resources, 
and they should be able to make choices that matter to them” (Alkire 2005, p 117). This seemingly 
straightforward idea provides the foundation of a distinction that makes the capability approach 
unique: the distinction between functionings and capabilities. Functionings are “the various things 
a person may value doing or being” (Sen 1999, p 75), from being nourished to being able to 
participate in political activities. Alkire claims that functionings are constitutive of a person’s 
being and for this reason the capability approach can appreciate all changes in a person’s life, 
“from knowledge to relationships to employment opportunities” (p 119). But measuring life’s 
quality only on the basis of achieved functionings – as other consequentialist approaches do – is 
partial. In order to get a comprehensive picture of a person’s quality of life, we should also consider 
the freedom that an individual has in deciding which path to pursue. The question to ask is not 
only what a person has done, but rather what a person is able to do and to be. According to 
Nussbaum, “the crucial good societies should be promoting for their people is a set of 
opportunities, or substantial freedoms, which people then may or may not exercise in action: the 
choice is theirs” (2000, p 18). Capabilities are a range of potential functionings that are feasible 
for a person to achieve. By distinguishing between functionings and capabilities, the capability 
approach is explicitly pluralist about values and, at least in principle, avoids paternalism14, since 
the goal of a policy based on this approach should be to expand “people’s capabilities and not force 
people into certain functionings” (Oosterlaken 2015, p 224). When a person is stimulated to 
expand capabilities rather than being forced into functionings, that person has the freedom to 
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efforts (see Cenci and Cawthorne 2020) 
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instantiate those patterns of behaviors and thoughts that he/she thinks constitute the good life and 
living well.  
Nussbaum compiles a list of central capabilities stemming from an idea of what it means 
for a human to function well. These include life; bodily health; bodily integrity; senses, 
imagination, and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; (being able to live with concern 
for nature and) other species; play; control over one’s environment (for details on this list, see 
Nussbaum 2006, pp 76-78). The distinction between functionings and capabilities should be also 
complemented with the idea that availability of resources is not a sufficient condition for increased 
capabilities or functionings. There are other factors - such as personal, social, and environmental 
factors - that determine “the degree to which a person can transform a resource into a functioning” 
(Robeyns 2016, p 406), and they are called ‘conversion factors’. 
Technology and capabilities are tightly connected (Oosterlaken 2015; Coeckelbergh 2010; 
2011). As Vallor says, technologies “invite or afford specific patterns of thoughts, behavior, and 
valuing” (2016, p 2). In terms of capabilities, we can say that technologies can shape both the 
internal characteristics of individuals and those environmental factors that, combined together, 
constitute combined capabilities, which filter what can be transformed into functionings. 
Technology is so important for capabilities not only because we use technical artifacts which 
sometimes shape what we can or cannot do, but also because those artifacts are embedded in the 
same sociotechnical systems in which we are embedded, and they arguably shape those systems. 
For instance, “ICTs [i.e. information and communication technologies] change the ways in which 
governments and politicians go about their daily business, which may in turn have consequences 
for an individual’s capability to have control over his/her political environment” (Oosterlaken 
2015, p 229). In general, using the capability approach in the context of ethics of information 
technologies can be potentially very fruitful, given that it “allows to highlight how information 
technologies shape what people are (or will) actually be able to do” (Coeckelbergh 2011, p 81). 
What does this have to do with ethical relevance, ethical training, and the cultivation of 
moral attention? If actions have ethical relevance in the way defined in 3.1, then it is like saying 
that actions can potentially shape capabilities, in the sense of shaping what people can choose to 
be or do (i.e. their substantial freedoms). There is overwhelming evidence that the work of data 
scientists can potentially shape capabilities, in particular by training algorithmic systems for 
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automated tasks in ways that can potentially filter what data subjects can do, be and have access 
to (Vold and Whittlestone 2019).15 Given the overwhelming number of ways in which data 
scientists impact other people’s lives, we propose to use Nussbaum’s list as a way to identify 
crucial loci of impacts that can make an important difference in terms of social justice. In other 
words, data scientists’ decisions have ethical relevance anytime those decisions impact the 
substantial freedoms implied by Nussbaum’s basic capabilities, and the way data subjects can 
possibly exercise them. Therefore, the capability approach is used as a heuristic to restrict the scope 
of what is crucial within what is ethically relevant. However, here the approach itself is not used 
to decide which course of action is morally the best, at least not at the stage we are discussing it, 
so rather than an ethical theory, we consider our use of capabilities as a mere approach, which is 
open to becoming a theory in different ways     . 
Another way of putting this is to say that we use the capability approach merely as a tool 
to stimulate and habituate ethical thinking in data scientists’ everyday activities. This excludes 
normative commitments to the evaluation of specific capabilities. There may be other goals in 
using this approach, which may imply normative choices. For instance, one can use the capability 
approach as a theory to guide the deliberation between different stakeholders in the design of a 
piece of technology, such as an algorithmic system. But our ‘pedagogical goal’ (i.e. using 
capabilities to habituate data scientists to identify what is ethically relevant) is not in contrast with 
a more ‘deliberative’ approach. First, the two approaches do not exclude one another. Second, we 
think that habituating data scientists to ethical thinking may make the hypothetical deliberative 
process as a whole more effective, because data scientists will be more sensitive to many of the 
                                                     
15 In particular, data scientists will impact ‘conversion factors’ or, at least, whether some factors become conversion 
factors (more on this in Section 4). A famous example of how small technical choices have ethical relevance for 
capabilities and conversion factors is the study by Obermeyer et al. (2019). In this article, the authors analyze the 
performances of a typical commercial risk-prediction tool that is used by large health systems and applied to roughly 
200 million people in the United States to target high-risk individuals. The aim of the algorithm is to identify those 
who need additional attention and resources. The problem with this tool, they say, is that it uses health care cost as a 
proxy for health, and hence as a proxy to identify those who need more attention. In particular, the algorithm used 
demographics, insurance type, diagnosis codes, procedure codes, medication, and detailed costs to predict the 
appropriate label: this means that “the algorithm’s prediction on health needs, is, in fact, a prediction on health 
costs” (Obermeyer et al. 2019, p 450). But this seemingly uncontroversial predictive proxy generates interesting 
consequences: only those who have access to proper health care in the first instance can be recognized as needing 
more attention. This means that those who cannot have access to proper health care will be ignored by the tool. 
Therefore, the technical act of choosing certain features to train the algorithm rather than others has transformed 
some personal, social, and environmental circumstances into conversion factors enabling or disabling the very 
possibility of making choices pertaining to bodily and mental health. The ripple effect is significant. 
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issues discussed. In order to explain this idea better, let us discuss two other works where the 
capability approach has been used in relation to ethics of science and technology16.   
In (2020), Cenci and Cawthorne applied the capability approach to solve some specific 
problems of Value-Sensitive Design (VSD). They recognize that embedding values in the design 
of technologies can be problematic, because often a specific normative dimension is adopted, and 
it is usually the one of the most powerful stakeholder, thereby resulting in a paternalistic VSD 
implementation. However, analyses of how technologies impact the well-being of different 
stakeholders show that many times there is a tradeoff between different values, and that adopting 
substantial ethical theories may undermine the endeavor of reconciling seemingly 
incommensurable values. Cenci and Cawthorne support the idea that ethical proceduralism offers 
a significant alternative to handle problems that have challenged a VSD based on substantive 
ethical theories. In order to address problems about pluralism and paternalism, they propose a 
participatory process where different stakeholders can have their voice heard. They base their view 
on Sen’s deliberative approach to capabilities which, according to them, differs substantially from 
“Nussbaum’s deontological, expert-led, over-specified, complete and perfectionist list of ten basic 
capabilities” (p 2649). Despite our use of Nussbaum’s framework, our goal and Cenci and 
Cawthorne’s goal are compatible. There is indeed a debate on Nussbaum’s alleged shortcomings 
such as paternalism, ethnocentrism, and inattention to contexts (see Classen 2014). We do not aim 
to discuss these issues here, but our use of Nussbaum’s list is immune to all these shortcomings 
attributed to her approach. First, we are neutral with respect to Nussbaum’s quasi-Kantian claim 
that sees the notion of human dignity as providing a foundation for the approach. We do not need 
a strong substantive foundation of the approach for the way we use it,  because what we take from 
it is just the connection between what people can do or be, and how these can impact conceptions 
of ‘living well’ and the good life. The approach adds depth to the notion of ‘ethical relevance’ by 
specifying concepts such as internal capability, combined capability, substantial freedom, and 
functioning. Second, we are also immune to the widely discussed issue of which capability to 
select. The list is a great starting point for data scientists to cultivate the moral ability or skill of 
moral attention, given that the ten ‘central human capabilities’ are all moral entitlements, and hence 
they have ethical relevance. In other words, we just use the approach to stimulate data scientists to 
                                                     
16 We thank a reviewer for raising this point and suggest a few readings that we missed 
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recognize the ethical relevance of their own technical choices, but we leave to them and to their 
value judgements to decide positive and negative connotations: we want to avoid any form of 
nudging or paternalism. In fact, we are using Nussbaum’s list in a rather instrumental and 
minimalist way: this list is just a heuristic, in the sense that it can be understood as a way to navigate 
a complex conceptual space to identify what is ethically relevant and what is not. The positive and 
negative connotations of shaping capabilities in one way or another is a normative question that 
should be taken up in an ideal subsequent deliberative process - to which data scientists should 
participate - among stakeholders affected by the design of the algorithmic system. But the 
cultivation of moral attention via the heuristics of capabilities is also important for that deliberative 
process. While the participatory design envisioned by Cenci and Cawthorne implies that other 
people than data scientists should participate in the design process in order to have all voices heard 
(and we agree), it is important to foster and stimulate the cultivation of a moral sensibility that can 
predispose data scientists to a more fruitful dialogue both at the epistemic and moral level, which 
eventually can improve the deliberative process that Cenci and Cawthorne delineate - and moral 
attention can be important from this point of view. Using the list of capabilities as a tool to solicit 
ethical questions about the impact of data scientists’ technical choices is not only an important 
starting point; it is also essential, because in the public deliberative process the ethical relevance 
of many small technical choices and aspects of algorithmic system construction may be opaque to 
the relevant stakeholders, and hence data scientists must be put in the position to recognize them. 
To sum up, we embrace the procedural perspective of Cenci and Cawthorne, but we see 
Nussbaum’s list as a way to make the procedure more precise and effective (at least long-term) by 
habituating single data scientists to reason explicitly in ethical terms.  
We get to similar conclusions by analyzing an article which is in opposition to Cenci and 
Cawthorne’s work. In (2020), Jacobs implements the capability approach in VSD, but she decides 
to opt for Nussbaum’s approach rather than Sen’s procedural capability account as Cenci and 
Cawthorne. Her choice is motivated by the fact that VSD lacks substantive ethical commitment. 
While Cenci and Chawthorne solve this issue by proposing a procedural approach, Jacobs argues 
explicitly for a substantive ethical commitment, which, in her opinion, Nussbaum’s theory 
provides. While Jacobs and the present work emphasize Nussbaum’s list, our use is, again, 
instrumental and not substantive. In a sense, Nussbaum’s approach can form, in our opinion, the 
backbone of a procedure that can inform ethical decision-making and ethics pedagogy, which is 
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also something that Jacobs and others recognize (pp 3369-3370). But when we stay at the level of 
habituating data scientists to ethical reasoning, we are not bound up to use Nussbaum’s approach 
in a substantive way, as Jacobs does. When scholars like Jacobs say that capabilities, and central 
capabilities in particular, “should be brought to at least a threshold level (...) to lead a dignified 
life” (Jacobs 2020, p 3372), our use of Nussbaum’s approach does not address which threshold is 
necessary: we just say that for the purpose of habituating to ethical reasoning, recognizing that 
capabilities are connected to leading a dignified life is all that matters. 
 
3.3 A microethical approach to the practice of data science 
Now we have all the ingredients to specify what a microethics approach (Komesaroff 1995) to 
data science and its ethical training is. This approach has several components. 
First, there is a general view that the aim of ethical training is to cultivate moral excellences in 
identifying the ethical dimension of a situation. Ethical training happens along the same lines and 
in the same context in which data scientists learn the skills necessary to become skilled data 
scientists – ethics is not external to practice. As a data scientist learns the necessary skills for data 
science by practicing and by learning from role models, so a data scientist becomes a good data 
scientist by practicing and by learning from role models about the ethical subtleties of the data 
science profession.  
The second component is a description of the moral abilities (or those components of character 
virtues)      data scientists should cultivate.  We have focused our attention on moral attention, 
which is a moral ability for identifying and grasping the ethical relevance of a situation. We have 
defined a decision as ethically relevant when it has profound impacts on one’s ability to realize 
one’s conception of ‘living well’ and ‘good life’. We have made this insight more precise by 
connecting it to the capability approach: when something is ethically relevant, it impacts one or 
more of the central capabilities identified by Nussbaum. We use the approach as a way to identify 
proxies for ethical relevance.  
This approach is a microethics because it prioritizes the minutiae of the small, daily, technical 
acts of data scientists and their ethical relevance. In other words, one cultivates moral attention by 
systematically asking questions about the relevance of each technical process or operation (e.g. 
training algorithms, cleaning data sets, etc.) for the basic capabilities of data subjects. The approach 
is not principled because we do not apply general concepts to technical decisions. Rather, the idea 
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is to reflect on how data science tools impact data subjects’ ability to exercise substantial freedoms, 
and to shape the data science process accordingly. A rich microethics emerges in the sense that 
technical mundane decisions and ethical considerations shape one another. 
 
 
4 CULTIVATING MORAL ATTENTION IN THE PRACTICE OF DATA SCIENCE 
In this section, we show how the heuristic of asking questions about capabilities can be put 
fruitfully at work in the context of healthcare data science. The goal is to give an idea of how 
ethically rich and dense data science turns out to be when the ethical relevant aspects of the 
technical process are identified through our microethical lens. In what follows, we first 
contextualize our approach in health care (4.1), then we present an idealized framework illustrating 
the data science process (4.2), and show how seemingly mundane technical decisions can impact 
significantly various capabilities (4.3). In particular, we will show in detail how in the stages of 
data understanding and preparation data scientists can use questions about capabilities (and about 
the factors normally shaping them) as a proxy to embed ethics in the practice of data science and 
to become familiar with ethical issues in their work. While we will briefly comment on other 
phases of the data science process, our choice of focusing on data understanding and preparation 
is motivated by the fact that in the literature this stage has been largely ignored by those seeking 
to promote a more ethical data science, probably because from a macro-ethical perspective it looks 
like a stage with little ethical relevance.  
 
4.1 Contextualizing capabilities in health care 
It is important to emphasize that, while we provide a general heuristic, the nitty-gritty of how the 
heuristics is applied and developed will depend on the specific context. In other words, although 
Nussbaum’s ten capabilities (2006) are broadly relevant for moral attention within any data science 
project, several of them appear particularly likely to arise in specific domains. For instance, life 
and health are affected by many data science applications to healthcare; bodily integrity and control 
over one’s environment would arise easily in the legal domain; ability to have concern for other 
species impacts environmental and agricultural projects; and capability to use one’s senses, 
imagination and thought is directly affected by education and other cultural projects; and so on. 
The remainder of the paper will focus on the healthcare domain, and thus health will be particularly 
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relevant. In particular, we will characterize the cultivation of moral attention in this context as a 
twofold process.  
First, data scientists should pay attention to how impairing health can downstream impair 
other important capabilities. Life and bodily health are certainly important both as functionings 
and capabilities, because possessing them can have important impacts on the other capabilities. 
One may also say that they are the necessary condition for having at least the possibility of the 
substantial freedoms of the other capabilities. In cultivating moral attention, an important 
component of asking questions about capabilities requires understanding the relation between 
health as a capability and other capabilities. This is especially because limited health may impact 
some conversion factors that will likely impact other capabilities as well. 
The second part of the process is to cultivate and exercise moral attention to understand 
health as a capability. According to the capability approach, there is more to health than just health 
itself. Ruger (2010) dissects the health capability as being composed by health functioning and 
health agency. Health agency is an instance of agency freedom – the foundation of the capability 
approach - and is defined by Ruger as “individuals ability to achieve health goals they value” 
(2010, p 42). In Ruger’s view, health agency requires a number of ‘conversion factors’ that allow 
subjects to realize whatever valuable health goals they want to realize. At the individual level, 
conversion factors include health knowledge, health-seeking skills, self-governance, effective 
health-decision making, etc., (for a complete list see Ruger 2010). At the social level, health agency 
requires external factors, such as social norms, social networks and capital, group membership, 
material circumstances, access to health services, etc. This is because health agency “is dependent 
on how one’s external environment enhances or detracts from an individual” (Ruger 2010, p 43). 
As examined below, some of these internal and external factors affecting individuals can be 
identified and/or inferred by electronic health records (EHRs). Therefore, cultivating moral 
attention requires that data scientists pay attention to how the mundane technical decisions 
obfuscate or hide some of these factors. 
 
4.2 The Data Science Process 
To organize the data science process, we use a linearized, stepwise characterization common to 
introductory textbooks and language of the practice, acknowledging that the process is iterative 
and often cyclic (see Figure 1). We organize the linearized process into seven stages grouped into 
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three phases. The early phase of a data science project consists of stages for (1) problem 
understanding and definition and (2) data acquisition. The middle phase consists of (3) data 
understanding and preparation, (4) data analysis and modeling, and (5) validation and 
interpretation of the model. The late phase consists of (6) communication and deploying the results 
and (7) evaluating feedback on the solution. The middle phase receives the most technical 
emphasis, while the early and late phases are more dependent upon the domain and broad social 
context. Defining and understanding the problem may require looking ahead and attempting 
preliminary solutions, which can drive an iterative or cyclic process, and intrinsic uncertainty may 
necessitate moving forward through stages anticipating the need to backtrack later. We clarify the 
detailed process among the numerous ways data science—as a young, rapidly expanding field—
is conceived to identify specific places where moral attention adds technical as well as ethical 
value to data science, and in the following section we discuss data understanding and preparation 
in detail in a healthcare context.
 



































4.3 Microethics of data understanding and preparation  
As a working example, consider the problem of extracting text from Electronic Health Records 
(EHR) in order to construct features on Social Determinants of Health (SDoH) useful for 
prediction, cohorting, and possible intervention for patients with diabetes and/or cardiovascular 
disease. An appropriate dataset could be the EHR of patients in a national or large US healthcare 
system, such a hospital, Health Maintenance Organization (HMO), or Medicare Advantage 
program.  
Data understanding is the process of describing and exploring the data and identifying data 
quality issues to understand its size, quantity, and accuracy. Data descriptions characterize the 
dimensionality and sparsity of the data records, and data exploration involves summary statistics, 
visualization, and other methods in an initially unstructured way to better understand the nature of 
the data set. Data quality problems include missing data, noise, artifacts, outliers, inconsistency, 
and duplicate data. Data preparation consists of cleaning the data followed by transforming and 
reducing it to prepare for modeling. Data cleaning can be an unanticipated, time-consuming aspect 
of the process and involves addressing the data quality problems: discarding or imputing missing 
data, smoothing out noisy data, removing artifacts and outliers, correcting inconsistencies, and 
removing duplicate data. Data transformation changes the data values, format, or structure in a 
way more amenable to the problem being addressed and includes normalization, standardization, 
and feature construction; and data reduction modifies the quantity and/or structure of the data by 
sampling, selecting features, or applying dimensionality reduction methods, such as principal 
component analysis.  
 
4.3.1 Data Understanding 
Let’s start by analyzing the microethics of data understanding. This process illustrates well the 
importance of a micro-ethics based on the capability approach in filling the gaps created by a duty-
oriented professional ethic or regulatory compliance. If data fairness were incorporated in the data 
acquisition stage, and one successfully avoids data uses prohibited by regulations such as HIPAA 
and GDPR, then from a principled/rule-based  perspective, the data understanding and preparation 
stage is ethically relatively straightforward. One should be sufficiently conscientious about 
potentially conflicting demands implicit in understanding the data to prepare it accurately and 
unbiasedly for an anticipated modeling approach in a timely manner, so the data used to generate 
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the model still corresponds closely to the source, and one should be a good steward of corporate 
and/or client resources and accountable to deadlines. However, most of the time at this stage there 
are numerous mundane decisions, which may still have significant ethical and other sociotechnical 
impacts. A micro-ethics approach to data understanding requires not only understanding the data 
statistically but also in its sociotechnical context. Moral attention can help identify geographic, 
biomedical, behavioral, and social factors that may influence understanding the structured data, 
and which incidentally are also ‘conversion factors’ that can impact capabilities (Ruger 2010). 
Geographic neighborhoods (such as US zip codes) can be a proxy for a variety of socioeconomic 
factors, race/ethnicity demographics may indicate known genetic allele difference associated with 
disease propensity across populations, occupation may suggest environmental toxicities or 
stressors, and variations in healthcare systems may correlate with quality of care. In other words, 
the idea is that data scientists should develop an ability to identify some of the factors that can 
function as ‘conversion factors’ affecting capabilities, and hence having ethical relevance. 
But what point of the process demands the greatest attention? And to which factors? Moral 
attention should be exercised especially in the most mundane decisions. For instance, in 
understanding unstructured EHR data, one might discover that 80% of the data is exported cleanly 
from an electronic medical records (EMR) system and 20% requires optical character recognition 
(OCR) of scanned or faxed documents. A technically prudent and accountable decision might be 
to set aside the potentially very time-consuming OCR documents until later and proceed with the 
EMR-exported 80%. However, if the OCR documents predominantly come from small clinics in 
underserved neighborhoods where SDoH factors could significantly differ from those receiving 
care in the EMR-enabled health system, then project, professional, and ethical requirements would 
demand at least understanding the OCR records. Therefore, in focusing on EMR data for matters 
of convenience, one should ask why certain data sets require OCR rather than EMR processing. 
This is a question that, if asked with capabilities (and conversion factors) in mind, can help data 
scientists to cultivate moral attention. First, let’s start with the relation between health agency and 
the choice of going through EMR or OCR data. If data sets are in OCR because they come from 
underserved areas, then one may negatively affect health agency of those who live in that area, 
because superficially skipping OCR data will mean excluding them from the ‘big data loop’ 
(Lehrman 2013), with bleak consequences for the health care they can possibly access. Being 
excluded from the loop means that no one will notice the particular conditions or lack of healthcare 
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affecting specific areas, which will become increasingly invisible. Therefore, attention should be 
paid to some of the conversion factors that shape health agency that Ruger identifies (2010), and 
that can be found in data sets or inferred from them. For instance, one can check if there are 
differences in EMR and OCR with respect to economic circumstances such as income and 
employment status, facilities and resources of neighborhoods, social security of the macrosocial 
environment, access or presence of barriers to health facilities, and general effectiveness of those 
facilities. Clearly, conversion factors at the individual level (e.g. self-governance, health-seeking 
skills) cannot be accessed by data scientists, but external conversion factors identifiable at the 
social level are less opaque and can be inferred by looking carefully at data sets.  These 
considerations are not important only for health agency per se - impact on a health capability can 
have downstream consequences also for other capabilities (Ruger 2010). In fact, health as a 
capability becomes even a conversion factor affecting the other capabilities. Poor or absent quality 
of care impacts capabilities of affiliation. This is because of both the material difficulties of 
engaging in social interaction in conditions of precarious health, as well as the psychological 
detrimental effects on our social skills. As a consequence, control over one’s environment is 
impacted as well (especially in the material sense meant by Nussbaum). Therefore, even a 
seemingly neutral and innocent technical decision of spending more time in understanding why 
some EHR data requires OCR can have substantial ethical relevance upon multiple capabilities. 
Another important aspect of data understanding is connected to missing data. Ethically 
relevant factors can affect data missing or appearing as outliers, and thus technical decisions 
deserve an additional layer of attention, which is genuinely moral. Including or excluding data can 
directly affect the capabilities of others. In understanding missing data, one generally distinguishes 
between three mechanisms of addressing missing data (Rubin 1976):  
1. missing completely at random (MCAR), which does not affect statistical analysis;  
2. missing at random (MAR), which although not actually random, can be statistically treated 
that way using other known variables; and 
3. missing not at random (MNAR), which is missing due to reasons the variable is measuring.  
Consider an intervention to improve access to nutritional food among patients with diabetes. To 
measure the effect of the intervention, one might choose participants who regularly have fasting 
glucose tolerance test results, as changes in those results could indicate whether the intervention 
affected blood sugar. Even though some participant’s glucose tests may not be obviously 
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“missing”, if they have less frequent testing due to other health conditions or unrecognized social 
factors, such as healthcare access or financial constraints, they could be excluded from the 
intervention due to the same underlying reasons that reduce their access to nutritious food and 
precipitate their diabetes, i.e., data MNAR. If data is MAR, one can use statistical methods to 
address the omission, making sure that no inadvertent inequities are introduced.  In deciding that 
some data are MAR instead of MNAR, one may compare subjects with and without data and 
establish that the data missing are not such because of conversion factors enabling health agency. 
In other words, we explore the data set, and systematically look for absence or presence of 
conversion factors enabling (or disabling) health agency. For instance, if those with fewer tests 
have similar health conditions, healthcare access given those conditions, and socioeconomic 
contexts of those with more tests, then you can conclude that the unknown reasons for fewer tests 
lie outside the scope of the intervention because those people excluded appear to have similar 
relevant capabilities (e.g. bodily health, bodily integrity, access to health care, etc.) to those 
included, and thus are MAR instead of MNAR. This systematizes an aspect of data science 
otherwise idiosyncratic and is where Ruger’s list of conversion factors shaping health agency can 
be useful to cultivate technical and moral attention: a data scientist will look exactly for those 
factors in the data set. In order to say that some data are MAR, one wants to ensure the missingness 
only depends upon known variables which have and/or depend on known capabilities, and that 
determination requires domain knowledge and has no purely statistical solution. If the data already 
exists, then it can be addressed statistically, for example if some health care payers or providers 
incentivize greater or lower number of tests, one can incorporate the payer-provider in analysis or 
model (after verifying that the healthcare access is not related to transportation or financial factors 
likely to affect the access to nutritious food). In other cases, the data may not appear as variables 
in the acquired data, but examining others of Ruger’s external factors may suggest acquiring 
additional variables that would improve the analysis or modeling both technically and ethically. 
One can hypothesize that it is a matter of healthcare access and consider the factors that would 
affect such access, such as finances or transportation. Assuming financial data is not directly 
available, one can use zip code or other area-based proxies, and for transportation, one might 
calculate distance between the participant and providers who have given the diabetes diagnosis 
using driving distance and public transportation travel time and then address, e.g., using 
representative samples across those variables as needed. However, since the study involves 
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nutritional food, then missingness due to access to nutritional food would be MNAR, and one could 
use something like transportation distance to the nearest grocery store with a large fresh food 
selection or other variables from Food Access Research Atlas (ERS/USDA, 2021) to determine 
how much that affects the available data. Therefore, moral attention here does not mean only 
imagining the moral ramifications of not having the data points; moral attention here requires a 
genuine understanding of the moral dimension of missing data by using domain knowledge to 
connect data explicitly to external factors influencing health agency. But as in the case of OCR 
data, concluding that data are MCAR or MAR when in fact they are missing not at random can 
also have consequences on other capabilities other than health.  By impacting bodily health, it also 
has detrimental effects, down the line, for the capabilities of senses, imagination, and thought in 
the sense of “[b]eing able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid beneficial pain” (Nussbaum 
2006, p 76). Moreover, affiliation and control over one’s material environment are impacted 
negatively. Therefore, a routine and technical procedure such as accounting for missing data not 
only can have ethical ramifications, but it requires the exercise of moral attention and the 
application of the heuristic of the capability approach in order to make the right technical decision. 
Some of these factors might also be discovered by attending closely to social or political factors, 
but moral attention to capabilities also orients how one uses those factors to maintain health 
agency, and thus the moral principle of autonomy. 
 
4.3.2 Data preparation 
In preparing data one engages in technical decisions concerning data cleaning, transformation, and 
reduction. Data Cleaning involves addressing the data quality problems discovered in data 
understanding, such as the missing data previously discussed. Data transformation changes the 
values, format, or structure of data and provides ample opportunities to expand or limit the 
capabilities of others. One often needs to normalize, scale, standardize, or bin the data for analysis 
and visualization, which can obscure heterogeneity. For example, binning Body Mass Index (BMI) 
may simplify analysis for predicting diabetes or cardiovascular disease, but incorporating sex and 
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ethnic differences in creating BMI bins can yield better predictive models and thus improve access 
to appropriate interventions.17  
One may also need to split or combine features, and feature engineering, in particular, lends 
itself to moral attention of capabilities. Feature engineering transforms the raw data into features 
that better represent the data for modeling. One of the benefits of a practiced or exemplary moral 
attention would be the ability to engineer features that correspond well to some of Ruger’s external 
factors that shapes health agency, functioning and, down the line, other important capabilities. 
Typically, one might need a variety of measures to ascertain the nuances of some of the external 
factors, and considering the existing features in those terms can add insight into data 
understanding. One may also want to split features based upon those factors affecting the health 
capability. For example, distinguishing smart phone access from other mobile phone access can 
indicate significant differences in access to healthcare information. Within feature engineering, 
thinking about the capabilities upon which different possible features might depend can increase 
awareness of the broader context. Although access to healthcare information should be identified 
in SDoH analysis based solely on domain knowledge, it can arise through moral attention 
elsewhere, e.g., the ability to ‘convert’ awareness of body changes to knowledge of medical 
‘symptoms’ and then to a timely decision to seek medical care. 
Transformation for unstructured data (e.g. texts) often involves tokenization and possible 
normalization (e.g., spell correction or lemmatization) and mapping to standardized medical 
language (ontologies). Text data may have additional nuance not captured in structured data and 
provides additional opportunities to create features oriented toward capturing those factors that 
can influence health agency. For example, patient interviews can be searched for terms related to 
social support, even if some specific questions about that were not explicitly asked. Although 
patient medical and behavioral histories and other reports have information essential for 
determining SDoH, differences in external factors between patients may also affect the text and 
the extraction of relevant factors. For example, non-native language speakers may use a more 
limited vocabulary; those with perceived or actual healthcare treatment disparities due to gender 
and ethnicity may have less detailed (or filtered) reports; staff in less rewarding healthcare systems 
                                                     
17
 Although differences in sex and ethnicity may not drive different medical treatments, taking them into account 
still may result in better predictive models, as they may serve as a proxy for social and cultural factors (Laxy  2018) 
or help account for demographic differences in self-report accuracy (Richmond 2015).  
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may have more spelling errors due to apathy, poorer education, or more stressful workloads; and 
patients may omit relevant factors due to embarrassment or to appear dutiful or compliant. For the 
data scientist, asking explicit questions on the external factors influencing health agency opens up 
the possibility for identifying omitted statements, such as a no mention of social support in an 
extended interview. In the overall data science process, interpreting or evaluating the model may 
suggest returning to the data transformation step and revising transformations to improve the 
representation of patient capabilities. 
During data reduction, sampling can exacerbate or address issues in representation, e.g., 
oversampling underrepresented groups can improve model performance across the targeted 
population compared to the population of the acquired data. In feature selection, one may attend 
to what external factors, if not other capabilities other than health, each feature measures: income 
indicates increased purchasing power; zip codes can reflect environmental stressors, healthcare 
access, and other qualities of life; mobility restrictions can affect transportation options; and the 
presence of expensive laboratory tests not mandated by a clear diagnostic indication may suggest 
greater access to healthcare. The goal of a microethical approach to moral attention is to see 
through the data to the social conversion factors affecting health agency and the capability of health 
sufficiently to enact at least the principle of nonmaleficence. Dimension reduction (e.g., principal 
component analysis) can have similar issues as feature engineering, but with greater obfuscation 
and less explainability and transparency, and any required standardizing of features can mask 
variations related to unrecognized capabilities.  
After the data understanding and preparation stage, we can look back at the prior stages to 
see if revisions are necessary. In the problem statement, the interventions were implied to be 
beneficial medical interventions, but the same processes could be used to identify individuals with 
high medical cost for possible cost reduction interventions. In those cases, the technically good 
data science practices would more readily diverge from the morally good ones, though moral 
attention may help minimize harm or suggest a creative solution to meet economic and moral 
needs. More subtly, even clearly beneficial interventions may be constrained for a cohort of 
patients by cost or number of available healthcare workers, in which case moral attention may 
identify multiple courses of action to be considered depending upon how the ethical tradeoffs are 
weighed. Varying emphasis on biomedical ethical principles, such as minimizing non-maleficence 
or maximizing beneficence could respectively lead to a large number of minimal interventions or 
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a smaller number of more effective interventions, and characterizing possible outcomes depends 
upon synthesizing specific information in the cohort only accessible via data science methods. 
Looking ahead in the data science process to data analysis and modeling also orients data 
understanding and preparation toward different possible ends, and highlights some challenges to 
moral attention caused by the frequent use of newly developed, complex modeling methods (such 
as recently, multimodal, deep learning) in highly-specialized, novel domains (such as, new 
CRISPR techniques for intervention). In these situations, the data scientist may be among the first 
to even consider such applications, so no prior ethical rules would exist. In these cases, moral 
action may require habituated practice at moral attention to evaluate the ethical tradeoffs among 
the extensive novel technical choices. 
 
5. MICROETHICS AND PARTICIPATORY DESIGN 
So far, we have described the dense microethics emerging from the ethical training to develop 
moral attention shaped by the capability approach. However, one can raise one issue against the 
project as a whole. Is this microethical training even realistic? In order for the data scientist to be 
able to develop moral attention more effectively in this context, he/she has to know a lot about 
SDoHs, and in general about the social and political dimension of health care. This is an important 
criticism that allows us to contextualize the work of data scientists in a wider process that, we 
think, should characterize the construction of algorithmic systems that also contribute to 
sociotechnical systems. 
 Indeed, we do think that data scientists should also have a preliminary and basic training 
in the particular field or discipline to which their work is applied. It is important that data scientists 
working with biomedical data have basic knowledge of the social dimension of the health care 
aspects shaped with their work. If working in education, then the data scientist needs to be initiated 
to basic notions of how a school system works, what do teachers do, the struggle they encounter, 
etc. Moreover, we must emphasize that data science should not be considered as extremely 
portable, in the sense that algorithmic systems should be designed with knowledge of the 
environments in which they will work, and not by abstracting too much from those environments 
because of technical convenience. And in order to do that, data scientists are required to know 
something more than just coding or statistics. 
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However, we should also be clear on another aspect. Data scientists cannot know 
everything, and also they may not be in a position to decide how to weigh the different ethical 
considerations that may emerge via the cultivation of moral attention. Data scientists should be 
humble, and recognize that they cannot design algorithmic systems only by themselves. This 
consideration has an interesting consequence, namely that the ethical training we describe is just a 
first step towards ethical algorithmic systems. Because algorithmic systems are going to shape 
capabilities of a number of individuals, relevant stakeholders should participate in a deliberation 
on how exactly those systems are going to be designed, which is a consideration already emerged 
when discussing Cenci and Cawthorne (2020) in Section 3.2. Moreover, in addition to 
stakeholders, social scientists should participate as well, because even if data scientists may have 
some background knowledge of, say, how health care systems work and how they impact 
individuals, a much more robust expertise is needed to appreciate the subtle ways in which 
capabilities are shaped18. Proposals to see algorithmic systems “as being embedded in a larger 
context of institutional or organizational norms and standards that safeguard the interests and 
goods of those it serves” (von Eschenbach 2021, p 14) go in this direction. But cultivating moral 
attention is nonetheless fundamental, because by developing a moral sensibility, data scientists can 
readily connect ethical issues with technical choices in the ideal deliberative process between 
stakeholders and social scientists that we have just sketched. For instance, the social scientist may 
emphasize some important aspects of SDoHs, but it is the data scientist that is more likely to make 
the direct connection between those SDoHs and some seemingly technical and neutral aspects of 
the data science process that the social scientist may overlook. In other words, the data scientist 
must be ready to understand how ethical/social issues and technical aspects shape one another, and 
developing moral attention will facilitate this process. This is surely a topic for another article, but 
we wish to highlight the place of the ethical training we have described here in a much bigger 




In this paper, we have envisioned the nature of ethical training in data science as an exercise aimed 
at progressively cultivating some abilities. These moral abilities will be learnt in the same way the 
                                                     
18 On the roles that social sciences can play in this kind of situations, see (Lohse and Canali, 2021) 
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technical skills necessary in the data science context are learnt. We have grounded our microethics 
approach in virtue ethics. The approach is ‘micro’ in the sense that it aims to identify the ethical 
relevance of every single mundane technical choice of data scientists, rather than merely 
understanding if a technical process is compliant with general ethical principles. In order to be able 
to identify the ethical relevance of technical choices, we have used the capability approach as 
heuristic that can help data scientists to familiarize with ethical problems raised by their tools. 
 This article is only an introduction to our microethical approach. We will need to elaborate 
a much more systematic pipeline that embed specific questions about capabilities (or at least more 
specific themes) in the different phases of the data science process. Depending on the context of 
the data science process, one will have to make extensive research on conversion factors affecting 
capabilities in that context. What we have accomplished here is just illustrative: after formulating 
our reasons in favor of our approach, in Section 4 we have shown how rich a microethics can be, 
and how ethics in general can be really hard and intricate. 
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